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VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: GROWING
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK AND CHALLENGES IN THE
EMERGING FINTECH ECOSYSTEM
V. GERARD COMIZIO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of a widely publicized explosion of new
technology and innovation designed to disrupt the marketplace of
traditional financial institutions in delivering financial services, the
number of financial technology (“fintech”) companies in the United
States and United Kingdom alone has grown to more than 4,000 in
recent years. Further, investment in this sector has grown from
$1.8 billion to $24 billion worldwide in just the last five years.1 The
financial services industry is experiencing rapid technological changes
as it seeks to meet and anticipate business opportunities and needs,
consumer demands and expectations, and demographic trends. In
particular, the advent of virtual currency (“VC”), beginning with
Bitcoin in 2008, has quickly exploded into an emerging financial
ecosystem composed of non-government based legal tender. This
emergence illustrates the exciting possibilities for peer-to-peer payment
systems, money transmission, mobile payment systems, and investment
opportunities not only for purchasers and sellers of VC, but also for
investors in VC business activity, and perhaps more significantly,
consumers. As such, VC presents potential business opportunities for
innovative fintech companies, as well as the banking and financial
services industry.
* Mr. Comizio is a partner at Fried Frank LLP, in its Washington, D.C. office, and chair of
the Global Banking Practice group, and regularly represents financial institutions in a wide
range of regulatory, transactional, and enforcement matters. Mr. Comizio is a member of
the Board of Advisors of the UNC School of Law’s Center for Banking and Finance.
1. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Regarding Special Purpose
National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies at the Georgetown University Law Center 1
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016152.pdf; see also infra Section III.C. and accompanying notes.
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However, the advent of virtual currencies has also brought
significant concerns about potential illegal and fraudulent activities
related to these currencies. Accordingly, governments, regulators, and
law enforcement authorities worldwide have been forced to focus on the
implications of these currencies. This focus has been dominated by
concerns about, among other things, the use of virtual currency in illegal
activities such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism and money laundering
activities, and customer theft and data breaches. Virtual currencies can
also pose existential threats to government-backed fiat currencies and
the global economy. In this light, the growing legal and regulatory
challenges seem clear—balancing an approach that fosters responsible
development of an innovative technology that spurs potentially
significant benefits with an effective legal and regulatory framework
that protects consumers, businesses, and the financial system.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses the
background of virtual currency—primarily Bitcoin’s development and
legal and regulatory complications, including the Silk Road and Mt.
Gox prosecutions that have arisen in connection with virtual currency in
business activities.2 Part III discusses major legal, enforcement, and
regulatory initiatives that address challenges related to virtual
currencies, both in the United States and in countries with major
financial services industries.3 Part IV discusses international legal and
regulatory developments, surveying select jurisdictions with significant
impacts on the global financial services industry.4 Finally, Part V
briefly concludes with some closing thoughts.5
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Bitcoin Developments

In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto—the mysterious creator of
bitcoin—triggered a potential revolution in global currencies, payment
systems, financial services, and fintech business and regulation by
publishing an eight-page paper entitled Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer

2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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Electronic Cash System.6 This paper offered a clear enough thesis:
proposing a “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without
going through a financial institution.”7
The first bitcoin was created in 2009 after Nakamoto released
the Bitcoin Network (“Bitcoin Network”) source code, which is the
software and protocol that created and launched the Bitcoin Network.8
Since its introduction, the Bitcoin Network has been under active
development by a group of contributors, currently headed by Wladimir
J. van der Laan, who was appointed project maintainer in 2014.9 As an
“open source” project, an official organization or authority does not
represent Bitcoin.10
While technically complex, bitcoin is essentially a digital asset
that is issued by, and transmitted through, the decentralized, open
source protocol of the peer-to-peer Bitcoin Network.11 “The Bitcoin
Network hosts the decentralized public transaction ledger, known as the
Blockchain, on which all bitcoin is recorded.”12 No single entity owns
or operates the Bitcoin Network, “the infrastructure of which is
collectively maintained by a decentralized user base.”13 “Bitcoin can be
used to pay for goods and services or can be converted to fiat

6. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Oct.
31, 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Much controversy and discussion has surrounded
the true identity of Satoshi Nakamoto, and to date, no one has come forward to claim that he
or she is Nakamoto.
See, e.g., Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, COINDESK, http://
www.coindesk.com/information/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
While this article focuses primarily on legal and regulatory issues associated with bitcoin as
the first virtual currency, there has been an explosion of virtual currencies in recent years,
including, but not limited to ether, litecoin, peercoin, freicoin, ripple and linden dollar,
dogecoin, primecoin, darkcoin, and primecoin. Prableen Bajpai, The Five Most Important
Virtual Currencies Other Than Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 10, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/121014/5-most-important-virtual-currenciesother-bitcoin.asp; Reuven Cohen, The Top 30 Crypoto-Currency Market Capitalizations in
One Place, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen/
2013/11/27/the-top-30-crypto-currency-market-capitalizations-in-one-place/print/.
7. Nakamoto, supra note 6, at 1.
8. For an in-depth discussion of bitcoin, see Winklevoss Bitcoin Tr., Registration
Statement No. 333-189752, 13–23 (Am. No. 6 to Form S-1) (June 29, 2016) (Proposed
bitcoin exchange traded fund).
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, at rates determined on Bitcoin
Exchanges or in individual end-user-to-end-user transactions under a
barter system.”14
Bitcoin is “stored” or reflected on the digital transaction
ledger known as the “Blockchain,” which is a digital file
stored in a decentralized manner on the computers of
each Bitcoin Network user. The Bitcoin Network
software source code includes the protocols that govern
the creation of bitcoin and the cryptographic system that
secures and verifies bitcoin
transactions.
The
Blockchain is a canonical record of every bitcoin
transaction (including the creation or “mining” of new
bitcoin) and every Bitcoin address associated with a
quantity of bitcoin. The Bitcoin Network and Bitcoin
Network software programs can interpret the Blockchain
to determine the exact bitcoin balance, if any, of any
public Bitcoin address listed in the Blockchain as having
taken part in a transaction on the Bitcoin Network.15
However, this public information is limited to the address and
does not include the identity of the user.
The Bitcoin Network utilizes the Blockchain to evidence
the existence of bitcoin in any public Bitcoin address. A
Bitcoin private key controls the transfer or “spending”
of bitcoin from its associated public Bitcoin address. A
Bitcoin wallet is a collection of private keys and their
associated public Bitcoin addresses.
The Blockchain is comprised of a digital file,
downloaded and stored, in whole or in part, on all
Bitcoin Network users’ software programs. The file
includes all blocks that have been solved by miners and
is updated to include new blocks as they are solved. As
each newly solved block refers back to and “connects”

14. Id.
15. Id. at 39
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with the immediately prior solved block, the addition of
a new block adds to the Blockchain in a manner similar
to a new link being added to a chain. Each new block
records outstanding Bitcoin transactions, and
outstanding transactions are settled and validated
through such recording, the Blockchain represents a
complete, transparent and unbroken history of all
transactions of the Bitcoin Network. Each bitcoin
transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin Network and
recorded in the Blockchain . . . .
The Bitcoin Network is decentralized and does
not rely on either governmental authorities or financial
institutions to create, transmit, or determine the value of
bitcoin. Rather, bitcoin is created and allocated by the
Bitcoin Network protocol through a “mining” process
subject to a strict, well-known issuance schedule. The
value of bitcoin is determined by the supply of and
demand for bitcoin in the bitcoin exchange market (and
in private end-user-to-end-user transactions), as well as
the number of merchants that accept them.16
B.

Early Regulatory and Law Enforcement Problems
1. Silk Road

Silk Road was an online black market, and the first “dark net
market,” best known as a platform for selling illegal drugs and other
illicit goods and services purchased with bitcoin.17 Silk Road placed a
spotlight on the “dark net” or “dark web”—hidden or so-called overlay
networks that can only be accessed with specific software or
authorizations, usually through either peer-to-peer file sharing networks,
16. Id. at 39–40.
17. See David Lee, U.S. Makes Bitcoin Exchange Arrests After Silk Road Closure,

BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/technology-25919482 (describing the
arrest of an individual who was accused of allowing another individual to purchase and
resell large quantities of bitcoin to “Silk Road users who want[ed] to anonymously buy
drugs”). The Silk Road was a historical network of trade routes started during the Chinese
Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) connecting Europe and many countries on the Eurasian
Land Mass. VADIME ELISEEFF, THE SILK ROAD: HIGHWAYS OF CULTURE AND COMMERCE
(2001).
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or privacy networks,18 such as Tor,19 and perhaps more significantly, the
ability to anonymously use bitcoin for illegal transactions—particularly
since Silk Road in fact, only accepted bitcoin.20
Silk Road, founded in February 2011 by Ross Ulbricht, quickly
gained public notoriety and internet buzz, including scrutiny from a
U.S. Senator, who publicly asked U.S. law enforcement authorities,
including the U.S. Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement
Administration, to shut it down.21 Its notoriety was further exacerbated
by the fact that its founder went by the swashbuckling pseudonym
“Dread Pirate Roberts,”22 espousing a libertarian goal for Silk Road,
posted at its website, “[t]o grow into a force to be reckoned with that
can challenge the powers that be and at last give people the option to
choose freedom over tyranny.”23 By 2013 the Silk Road had nearly one
million account users, facilitating over 1.2 million transactions worth
18. See generally Jessica Wood, The Darknet: A Digital Copyright Revolution, 16
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 14 (2010).
19. Tessa Miller, How Can I Stay Anonymous with Tor?, LIFEHACKER (Jan. 10, 2014,
2:00 PM), http://lifehacker.com/how-can-i-stay-anonymous-with-tor-1498876762; Kyle
Torpay, BlockChain.info Launches Tor Hidden Service, INSIDE BITCOINS (Dec. 2, 2014, 2:55
PM), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/blockchain-info-launches-tor-hidden-service/26920.
20. See, e.g., Brian Patrick Eha, Could the Silk Road Closure be Good for Bitcoin?,
THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/couldthe-silk-road-closure-be-good-for-bitcoin; Amrutha Gayathri, From Marijuana to LSD, Now
Illegal Drugs Delivered on Your Doorstep, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2011, 3:31 AM)
http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-lsd-now-illegal-drugs-delivered-your-doorstep-290021;
Adrian Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable,
GAWKER (June 1, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://gawker.com/the-underground-website-where-youcan-buy-any-drug-imag-30818160.
21. See Schumer Pushes to Shut Down Online Drug Marketplace, NBC N.Y. (updated
May 31, 2016, 12:49 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Schumer-Calls-onFeds-to-Shut-Down-Online-Drug-Marketplace-123187958.html (highlighting the website’s
operation and Senator Schumer’s call for federal authorities to have it removed); see also
Kevin McCoy, Silk Road Founder Hit with Life Imprisonment, USA TODAY (May 29, 2015,
4:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/29/ulbricht-silk-road-sentencing/
28072247/ (detailing the trial of Ross Ulbricht and his founding and operation of Silk Road
since 2011).
22. Andy Greenberg, Meet the Dread Pirate Roberts, The Man Behind Booming Black
Market Drug Website
Silk Road, FORBES, (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2013/08/14/meet-the-dread-pirate-roberts-the-man-behind-booming-blackmarket-drug-website-silk-road/print/. The name “Dread Pirate Roberts” was apparently
taken from a character in the 1987 movie The Princess Bride, who was feared for his
ruthlessness, sword fighting prowess, and well known for taking no prisoners. Id.; THE
PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).
23. Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How the Feds Took Down the Dread Pirate
Roberts, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/10/how-the-feds-took-down-the-dread-pirate-roberts/.
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9.5 million bitcoin—approximately $1.2 billion in total money
exchanged—in a two and a half year period.24
After a lengthy government investigation by a host of U.S.
federal agencies and other governments25 in October 2013, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shut down the website and arrested Ross
Ulbricht, prosecuting him for omnibus violations of federal drug and
anti-money laundering laws and ordering him to pay restitution of $183
million, representing all sales of illegal items on Silk Road.26 He was
convicted on numerous other charges, including illegal drug sales, and
was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.27

Id.
In announcing indictments of parties related to the Silk Road website, it is
interesting to note that the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case made the following statement
of thanks in his press release:
24.
25.

Mr. Bharara praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and
its New York Special Operations and Cyber Division, as well as the
outstanding investigative work of the DEA’s New York Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force, which comprises agents and
officers of the DEA, the IRS, the New York City Police Department,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) Homeland
Security Investigations (“HIS”), the New York State Police, the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Secret Service,
the U.S. Marshals Service, Office of Foreign Assets Control, and NY
Department of Taxation. Mr. Bharara also thanked the ICE-HIS
Chicago-O’Hare office for its assistance and support, as well as the
Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section and Office of International Affairs. Additionally, Mr. Bharara
praised the foreign law enforcement partners whose contributions to the
success of the investigation and prosecution have been invaluable,
namely, the Australian Federal Police, the Irish Republic’s Computer
Crime Investigation Unit of the An Garda Siochana, the Reykjavik
Metropolitan Police of the Republic of Iceland, and the French
Republic’s Central Office for the Fight Against Crime Linked to
Information Technology and Communication.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Charges Against Three Individuals in Virginia, Ireland, and Australia for Their Roles in
Running the “Silk Road” Website (Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Silk Road Press Release],
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-againstthree-individuals-virginia-ireland-and.
26. See Nicole Hong, Silk Road Founder Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life in Prison,
WALL ST. J. (updated May 29, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/silk-roadfounder-ross-ulbricht-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-1432929957 (describing the penalties and
punishments levied against Ulbricht, including life in prison and a $183 million forfeiture).
27. Benjamin Weiser, Ross Ulbricht, Creator of Silk Road Website, is Sentenced to Life
in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/nyregion/rossulbricht-creator-of-silk-road-website-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.html?_r=0.

138

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

Subsequently, others associated with the website were also prosecuted.28
In connection with these prosecutions, the government seized over $100
million in bitcoins, $18 million of which it subsequently sold in auction
transactions.29
2. Mount Gox
The Mount Gox website, Mtgox.com, originally registered in
2007 by Jed McCaleb, an American entrepreneur, as a domain name for
the purpose of turning it into a trading site for game cards of a popular
online game, Magic: The Gathering.30 The site was live for only a few
months but McCaleb never followed through.31 However, in late 2010,
he decided to repurpose the domain as one of the first exchanges for the
purchase and sale of bitcoin.32 After realizing the time and attention
required to run the site, he sold it to Mark Karpelès while apparently
retaining a 12% interest.33 Karpelès, after revising the site’s backend
software, turned it into the world’s most popular bitcoin exchange,
headquartered in Tokyo.34 Notwithstanding a security breach due to
hacking in June 2011 that forced the site offline for several days, Mt.
Gox became a preeminent bitcoin trading exchange.35 During 2013,
bitcoin prices took off, climbing from $13 to more than $1,200 at its
peak.36 By April 2013, at about the same time the Silk Road situation
28. See Silk Road Press Release, supra note 25 (describing the roles of Andrew
Michael Jones, Gary Davis, and Peter Phillip Nash in Silk Road and their indictments).
Interestingly, Ulbricht was also accused of paying for the killing of five people, although
none were actually killed, and he was never prosecuted regarding these allegations. Hong,
supra note 26.
29. Peter Svensson, U.S. Marshals to Auction Seized Bitcoin, THE SEATTLE TIMES
(updated June 13, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/us-marshals-toauction-seized-bitcoin/.
30. Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster,
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Rachel Abrams, Matthew Goldstein, & Hiroko Tabuchi, Erosion of
Faith was Death Knell for Mt. Gox, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2014, 6:45 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/mt-gox-files-for-bankruptcy/ (describing how the
exchange handled 80% of all Bitcoin transactions at one point).
35. McMillan, supra note 30. During that same time period, there were reports that
other emerging bitcoin exchanges were also being hacked, losing customer funds, and
simply folding by 2013. Id.
36. McMillan, supra note 30.
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was attracting government scrutiny and press attention, Mt. Gox had
grown to handle 70% of the world’s bitcoin trades37 and suspended
trading on April 11–12 for a “market cool-down.”38
In May 2013, CoinLab filed a $75 million lawsuit against Mt.
Gox, alleging a breach of contract.39 The companies had formed a
partnership in February 2013 under which CoinLab handled all of Mt.
Gox’s North American services.40 CoinLab’s lawsuit contended that
Mt. Gox failed to allow it to move existing customers from Mt. Gox to
CoinLab.41
On May 14, 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) obtained a warrant to seize money from Mt. Gox’s U.S.
subsidiary’s account with payment processor Dwolla.42 The warrant
suggests the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an
investigative branch of the DHS, felt that the subsidiary, which was not
licensed by the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”), was operating as an unregistered money transmitter in the
U.S.43 Between May and July of that year, more than $5 million was
seized.44 On June 29, 2013, nonetheless, Mt. Gox received its money

37. Robert McMillan & Cade Metz, The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Bitcoin
Exchange, WIRED (Nov. 6, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/11/mtgox/.
According to a leaked business plan, the company at one point owned 100,000 bitcoin or
$50 million, and Karpelès apparently owned 88% of the company. McMillan, supra note
30.
38. MtGox.com (@MtGox) TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:29 AM), https://
web.archive.org/web/20131113055800/https://twitter.com/MtGox/status/
322355614414147588 (“Trading is suspended until 2013-04-12 02:00 AM UTC for market
cooldown. Once back trading will be also faster.”).
39. Adrian Chen, Massive Bitcoin Business Partnership Devolves Into $75 Million
Lawsuit, GAWKER (May 2, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://gawker.com/massive-bitcoin-businesspartnership-devolves-into-75-487857656.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Seizure Warrant, In re the Seizure of the contents of one Dwolla account (No.
13-1162 SKG) (D. Md. May 14, 2013) (authorizing Michael T. McFarland, Special Agent,
U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, to seize the contents of one Dwolla account held at
Veridian Credit Union).
43. See id. at 2 (“[N]either Mt. Gox nor the subsidiary, Mutul Sigillum LLC, is
registered as a Money Service Business.”). See also Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT Act”)
Act of 2001 § 373(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2015) (prohibiting unlicensed money
transmitting business); id. § 373(b), 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(a) (allowing the seizure of
illegally transmitted funds).
44. McMillan & Metz, supra note 37.
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services business (“MSB”) license from FinCEN.45
In November 2013, Mt. Gox customers were experiencing
delays of weeks to months in withdrawing funds from their accounts
and cashing out had become difficult to impossible.46 Things grew
worse, and on February 7, 2014, Mt. Gox halted all withdrawals.47 Less
than two weeks later, it suspended trading, closed its website and
exchange service, and filed for a form of bankruptcy protection under
Japanese law to allow courts to seek a buyer.48 In April 2014, the
company began liquidation proceedings.49 It announced that around
850,000 bitcoin, valued at roughly $480 million at the time, belonging
to customers and the company, was missing and likely stolen.50
Although 200,000 bitcoin have since been “found,” the reasons for the
disappearance—theft, fraud, mismanagement, or a combination of
these—remain unclear.51 Shortly before Mt. Gox’s website went
offline, six other major bitcoin exchanges released a joint statement
distancing themselves from Mt. Gox amid steep drops in bitcoin prices
and new demands for government regulation of the bitcoin industry.52

45. Vitalik Buterin, MtGox Gets FinCen MSB License, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (June 29,
2013, 3:38 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/mtgox-gets-fincen-msb-license1372534713/.
46. McMillan & Metz, supra note 37.
47. Matt Clinch, Bitcoin Plummets 20% After Major Exchange Halts Withdrawals,
CNBC (Feb. 7, 2014, 6:49 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/02/07/bitcoin-plummets-20after-major-exchange-halts-withdrawals.html.
48. Abrams et al., supra note 34; Ben McLannahan, Bitcoin Exchange Mt Gox Files
for Bankruptcy Protection, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/
6636e0e8-a06e-11e3-a72c-00144feab7de.
49. Sam Byford, Mt. Gox Abandons Rebuilding Plans and Files for Liquidation: WSJ,
THE VERGE (Apr. 16, 2014, 1:51 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/4/16/5619636/mtgox-asks-for-permission-to-liquidate; Takashi Mochizuki & Katy Stech, Mt. Gox Files for
Liquidation, WALL ST. J. (updated Apr. 16, 2014, 2:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702303663604579504691512965308.
50. Carter Dougherty & Grace Huang, Mt. Gox Seeks Bankruptcy After $480 Million
Bitcoin Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-02-28/mt-gox-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy.
51. Sophie Knight, Mt. Gox Says it Found 200,000 Bitcoins in ‘Forgotten’ Wallet,
REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-mtgoxwallet-idUSBREA2K05N20140321. Mt. Gox’s creditors are skeptical about the ‘missing”
bitcoins for two main reasons. Id. First, Mt. Gox announced the missing bitcoin wallet after
an Illinois judge allowed some of the bitcoin exchange’s movements to be tracked. Id.
Also, blockchain evidence is available to prove Mt. Gox knew where the bitcoins were
stored. Id.
52. Fred Ehrsam et al, Joint Statement Regarding Mt. Gox, THE COINBASE BLOG (Feb.
24, 2014), http://coinbase.tumblr.com/post/77766809700/joint-statement-regarding-mtgox.
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III. U.S. LEGAL AND REGULATORY INITIATIVES
A.

The Financial Crime Enforcement Network
1. Virtual Currency Guidance

FinCEN, charged with the mission of “safeguard[ing] the
[U.S.] financial system from illicit use and combat[ing] money
laundering,”53 has issued key federal guidance clarifying how it will
apply the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and other anti-money laundering
(“AML”) laws to virtual currencies.54 Following FinCEN’s 2011 final
rule on money services business, FinCEN released guidance on the
application of FinCEN’s regulation to parties administering,
exchanging, or using virtual currencies.55 In general, the guidance
provides that “administrators and exchangers” of “convertible virtual
currencies” are subject to the money transmitters (“MT”) rules, while
“users” of virtual currencies are exempt.56
The guidance defines a user as “a person that obtains virtual
currency to purchase goods or services.57 An exchanger is a person
engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual currency for real
currency, funds, or other virtual currency.”58 “An administrator is a
person engaged as a business in issuing (putting into circulation) a
virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw from
circulation) such virtual currency.”59
53. Mission, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://
www.fincen.gov/about/mission. FinCEN will also “promote national security through the
collection analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial
authorities.” Id.
54. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to
Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pts. 1010, 1021, 1022).
55. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION
OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSON’S ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES 1 (2013).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id. “A user who obtains convertible virtual currency and uses it to purchase real or
virtual goods or services is not a money servicing business (“MSB”) under FinCEN’s
regulations. Id. “Such activity, in and of itself, does not fit within the definition of ‘money
transmission services’ and therefore is not subject to FinCEN’s registration, reporting, and
recordkeeping regulations for MSBs.” Id.
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An administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts
and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys
or sells convertible virtual currency for any reason is a
money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulations, unless a
limitation to or exemption from the definition applies to
the person. FinCEN’s regulations define the term
“money transmitter” as a person that provides money
transmission services, or any other person engaged in
the transfer of funds. The term money transmission
services means the acceptance of currency, funds, or
other value that substitutes for currency from one person
and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value
that substitutes for currency to another location or
person by any means.
The definition of a money transmitter does not
differentiate between real currencies and convertible
virtual currencies. Accepting and transmitting anything
of value that substitutes for currency makes a person a
money transmitter under the regulations implementing
the BSA.60
FinCEN divided the activities of administrators and exchangers
regarding convertible virtual currencies into three categories.61 First,
dealing in e-currencies and e-precious metals by transmitting funds
between a customer and a third party that is not part of the currency or
commodity transaction.62 Second, administering
a
centralized
convertible virtual currency and facilitating the transfer of virtual
convertible currency between locations, or from one person to another
in a centralized repository.63 Third, transacting in a de-centralized
convertible virtual currency by (i) creating units of a virtual convertible
currency with no central repository and (ii) selling those units to another
person for real currency or its equivalent; or by facilitating the exchange
of a de-centralized convertible virtual currency from one person to a

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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third party for currency, funds, or other value.64
FinCEN also stated that because a convertible virtual currency is
not a “real” currency, FinCEN’s Prepaid Access regulations do not
apply to a person who accepts or transmits a convertible virtual
currency.65 The definition of “prepaid access” under the regulations is
limited to “access to funds or the value of funds.”66 Similarly,
FinCEN’s regulations regarding dealers in foreign exchange do not
apply to accepting real currency in exchange for convertible virtual
currency, and vice versa, because those regulations only apply to the
exchange of one real currency for another real currency.67
FinCEN’s new guidance did not eliminate existing exceptions to
the definition of money transmitter. According to FinCEN, determining
if a person is a “money transmitter” still depends on the specific facts
and circumstances surrounding a person’s activity.68 A person who
accepts currency, funds, or other value from one person and transmits
such currency, funds, or other value to another location or person, is still
not a money transmitter if the person is:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A provider of network access services to money
transmitters;
A provider of bill payment services between a
creditor or seller;
An operator of clearance and settlement systems
among regulated institutions;
A transporter of physical currency (such as
armored car services and couriers);
A prepaid access provider; or
A person who accepts and transmits funds only
integral to the sale of goods or the provision of
services (other than money transmission
services) by the person who is accepting and
transmitting the funds.69

64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 5 n.18 (citing and quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ww) (2016)).
67. Id. at 5–6.
68. Id. at 3 n. 10 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)).
69. Id.; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(B)(ii)(A)–(F).
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As such, a person meeting the definition of an “administrator”
or “exchanger” of a convertible virtual currency would not be subject to
FinCEN regulation if one of the exceptions above applies.
2. Ripple Labs Consent Decree
On May 5, 2015, virtual currency exchanger, Ripple Labs
(“Ripple”) entered into a consent decree with FinCEN, under which
Ripple admitted to conduct that violated the Bank Secrecy Act and other
AML laws70 and agreed to take remedial measures to prevent future
violations.71 Concurrently, Ripple entered into an almost identical
settlement agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of California, U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), under which
Ripple further agreed to cooperate with the DOJ in any investigations
into and prosecutions of AML violations associated with Ripple’s
conduct.72 As part of the settlement agreement FinCEN assessed a
$700,000 civil money penalty (“CMP”) against Ripple, and Ripple
forfeited an additional $450,000 to the DOJ.73
As FinCEN’s first BSA action against a virtual currency
exchange the size of the CMP was viewed as substantial given that in
recent years other money transmission businesses have been fined
smaller amounts for repeated AML violations over several years;
notably, Ripple and its affiliates were operating as MTs for only two
years.74 The statement of facts and violations attached to the consent
decree and settlement agreement sent a clear message that FinCEN and
the DOJ expect full compliance by virtual currency companies with all

70. For statutory and regulatory citations, as well as guidance, see FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, DSC RISK MGMT. MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, https://www.ffiec.gov/
bsa_aml_infobase/ documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_Manual.pdf.
71. See Ripple of Labs, Inc., No-2015-05 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes
Enf’t Div. May 5, 2015) (assessment of civil money penalty). In entering into the consent
decree, Ripple admitted to: (1) willful violations of the BSA’s MSB registration, program
and reporting requirements, as well as federal criminal law violations; (2) failure to
implement and maintain an AML program that was reasonably designed to prevent it from
being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities; and (3)
failure to report suspicious activity related to several financial transactions. Id. at 2–3.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 3.
74. See id. attach. a, at 1 (describing how Ripple Labs’ subsidiary XRP Fund II, LLC
was incorporated in 2013, which is two years before the penalty was passed down).
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BSA/AML requirements applicable to MTs.75 FinCEN cited its recent
guidance on virtual currency activities, noting that Ripple’s virtual
currency sales activities obliged Ripple to register as an MT and to
fulfill certain requirements applicable to MTs.76 These requirements
include maintenance of an AML policy and the appointment of an AML
compliance officer, as well as numerous recordkeeping, monitoring, and
reporting requirements.77 Although Ripple did eventually fulfill many
of these requirements after becoming an MT, it was penalized for the
interim period of several months when it was not compliant, as well as
for failing to adhere to the requirements of its AML policy in
connection with several sales.78
The consent decree and settlement agreement also specified
certain remedial measures to be taken by Ripple, including: (1) creation
and implementation of an AML training program; (2) an external audit
of Ripple’s AML program; (3) enhancement of Ripple’s AML
screening and monitoring capabilities; and (4) retroactive examination
of transactions for previously-undetected money laundering activity,
along with filing any required Suspicious Activity Reports on such
activity.79 Despite mandating general compliance with BSA/AML laws,
the remedial measures also specifically call for compliance with the socalled Funds Travel Rule (“Travel Rule”).80
The Travel Rule generally requires regulated financial
institutions, including MTs, to retain and include in payment
instructions certain information related to the payment and its
participants, so that a funds transfer can be traced from end to end even
if it passes through multiple intermediary financial institutions.81
Traditional payment systems such as credit card, ACH, and wire are
closed systems set up to support the entry and transmission of the
required information fields between participants, who must be regulated

See id. attach. a, at 4–6 (listing violations of the AML/BSA requirements).
Id. attach. a, at 4.
Id. attach. b, at 3–4.
Id. attach. a, at 5.
Id. attach. b, at 2–4.
Id. attach. b, at 4.
See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(e) (2016) (“Each agent, agency, branch, or office located
within the United States of a financial institution other than a bank is subject to the
requirements of this paragraph (e) with respect to a transmittal of funds in the amount of
$3,000 or more . . . .”).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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depository institutions.82 “However, . . . most cryptocurrencies are open
systems and users do not need to go through a financial institution in
order to effect transactions.”83 Commentators have observed that
finding out whether any given counterparty is a financial institution and
complying with the resulting Travel Rule requirements, while
maintaining the privacy—and indeed personal safety—of individuals,
presents an ongoing challenge for cryptocurrency businesses.84
B.

New York Department of Financial Services–Creating a
BitLicense and Trust Company Digital Currency Exchange
Charter

On August 12, 2013, the New York Department of Financial
Services (“NYDFS”), citing New York’s “long history of promoting
technical innovation—both within the financial sector and across our
economy,” announced that it had launched an inquiry into the
appropriate regulatory guidelines that it should put in place for virtual
currencies.85 Based on the fact that it had already conducted
“significant preliminary work” regarding the announced inquiry,
including making requests for information from virtual currency firms,86
the NYDFS expressed concern that “at a minimum,” “virtual currency
exchanges may be engaging in money transmission as defined in New
York law, an activity that is licensed and regulated by [NY]DFS.”87
While referencing the unique opportunities and challenges
presented by Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, NYDFS nevertheless
stressed that instances “where the cloak of anonymity provided by
virtual currencies has helped segment dangerous criminal activity, such
as drug smuggling, money laundering, gun running, and child

Id.
Dsu-Wei Yuen, FinCEN and Department of Justice Settle Anti-Money Laundering
Charges Against Crypto-Currency Company Ripple Labs, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP:
PAYMENT LAW ADVISOR (May 12, 2015), http://www.paymentlawadvisor.com/2015/05/12/
fincen-and-department-of-justice-settle-anti-money-laundering-charges-against-cryptocurrency-company-ripple-labs/.
84. See, e.g., id.
85. BENJAMIN M. LAWSKY, N.Y. STATE DEP’T. OF FIN. SERVS., NOTICE OF INQUIRY ON
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/
vc_01282014/notice_20130812_vc.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id.
82.
83.

2017]

REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

147

pornography.”88 As such, NYDFS observed that “[i]f virtual currencies
remain a virtual Wild West for narcotraffickers and other criminals, that
would not only threaten [U.S.] national security but also the very
existence of the virtual currency industry as a legitimate business
enterprise.”89
As such, NYDFS cited three reasons for “putting in place
regulatory safeguards that would be beneficial to the ‘long-term
strength’ of the virtual currency industry:”
First, safety and soundness requirements help
build greater confidence among customers that the funds
that they entrust to virtual currency companies will not
get stuck in a digital black hole. . . . Taking steps to
ensure
that
these
transactions—particularly
redemptions—are processed promptly is vital to earning
the faith and confidence of customers.
Second, serving as a money changer of choice
for terrorists, drug smugglers, illegal weapons dealers,
money launderers, and human traffickers could expose
the virtual currency industry to extraordinarily serious
criminal penalties. Taking steps to root out illegal
activity is both a legal and business imperative for
virtual currency firms.
Finally, both virtual currency companies—and
the currencies themselves—have received significant
interest from investors and venture capital firms. Similar
to any other industry, greater transparency and
accountability is critical to promoting sustained, long
term investment.90
On November 14, 2013, the NYDFS announced, “as the next
step in [its] inquiry,” that it would hold a public hearing on virtual
currency regulation.91 With an asserted focus on the interconnection

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Rob Wile, New York Will Be Holding Hearings on Bitcoin, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Nov. 4, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-to-hold-hearings-on88.
89.
90.
91.
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between money transmission regulations and virtual currency, NYDFS
noted that the hearings would also focus on the “possibility and
feasibility of NYDFS issuing a ‘BitLicense’ specific to virtual currency
transactions and activities,
which
would
include antimoney laundering and consumer protection requirements for licensed
entities.”92
The NYDFS conducted a year-long process, including two days
of public hearings on January 28–29, 2014, where NYDFS heard from
virtual currency investors, law enforcement agencies, and academics on
virtual currency issues. Subsequently, in March 2014, the NYDFS
announced a public order (“NYDFS VC Order”) initiating a process for
accepting licensing applications for virtual currency exchanges under
the N.Y. banking laws.93 Citing a demonstrated need for stronger
oversight of virtual currency exchanges after the Mt. Gox collapse,
NYDFS opted to offer a digital currency exchange banking charter
pursuant to its authority to grant limited, special purpose trust company
charters.94 The NYDFS VC Order also stressed that the new charter
should contain strong legal and operational controls, including “robust
BSA/AML requirements.”95
Following submission of a number of applications, on May 7,
2015, NYDFS granted a charter to itBit Trust Company LLC (“itBit”)
to operate as a commercial bitcoin exchange, the first virtual currency
company to receive such a charter from NYDFS.96 In granting
approval, the NYDFS press release stressed that it had conducted a
“rigorous review” of the application, including, but not limited to, the
company’s “anti-money laundering, capitalization, consumer protection
and cyber security standards.”97 Furthermore, the release noted that
bitcoin-2013-11 (containing full text of NYDFS press release).
92. Id.
93. N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., IN RE VIRTUAL CURRENCY EXCHS., ORDER PURSUANT TO
NEW YORK BANKING LAW §§ 2-B, 24, 32, 102-A AND 4001-B AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW
§§ 301(C) AND 302(A), (2014).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Grants First Charter to a New
York Virtual Currency Company (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter itBit Press Release], http://
www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1505071.htm; see also itBit Trust Company, LLC
Authorization Certificate, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. (May 6, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
banking/auth_cert_itBit_052015.pdf.
97. itBit Press Release, supra note 96. Since approving the itBit Charter, the NYDFS
approved a second virtual currency exchange charter. See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin.
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itBit would be required to meet the obligation for operating a trust
company under N.Y. law, as well as those under the final N.Y.
BitLicense regulations.98
Prior to the itBit approval, on July 17, 2014, NYDFS had
proposed for public comment a BitLicense regulatory framework for
virtual currency firms.99 These first-of-a-kind rules provided
comprehensive regulatory regimes applicable to a wide variety of
includes
virtual currency businesses.100 The framework, which
consumer protection, anti-money laundering, NYDFS examination and
suspension requirements, and cyber security rules, books, records,
financial disclosure capital adequacy, and audit requirements, was met
with mixed reaction by the virtual currency industry. The industry
responded with concerns that regulations could stifle innovation, while
realizing that the then-recent Mt. Gox scandal had reinforced regulatory
and law enforcement concerns about the virtual currency business.101 In
February 2015, NYDFS published an updated BitLicense framework
that incorporated feedback from the first round of public comments.102
The updated proposal, which was adopted in June 2015, contained a
series of changes and clarifications, including the creation of a two-year
transitional BitLicense to assist start-ups.103

Servs., NYDFS Grants Charter to “Gemini” Bitcoin Exchange Founded by Cameron and
Tyler Winklevoss (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1510051.htm
(describing the charter issued and giving a timeline of NYDFS virtual currency regulation).
98. itBit Press Release, supra note 96.
99. Proposed Rule on the Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses,
29 N.Y. Reg. 14 (July 23, 2014). Full text of the BitLicense Proposal is available from the
NYDFS’s website at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf. See
also Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Releases Proposed BitLicense
Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Firms (July 17, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
about/press/pr1407171.htm.
100. See 29 N.Y. Reg. 15. NYDFS specifically referenced the fact that the same week
NYDFS issued its notice of inquiry on virtual currencies a national magazine published an
interview with an alleged key figure in the “black market drug website” Silk Road, who
cited the virtual currency Bitcoin as a key ingredient in the site’s efforts to commit illegal
acts. See Greenberg, supra note 22; supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying notes.
101. Id.
102. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Notice of Revised BitLicense Regulatory Framework,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/rev_bitlicense_reg_framework.htm;
see
also
Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Business, 37 N.Y. Reg. 17, 18 (Feb. 25,
2015) (revising NYDFS BitLicense regulations).
103. 37 N.Y. Reg. 8 (June 24, 2015).
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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency–The Fintech
Charter

In the wake of a multi-year effort by NYDFS to pioneer the
establishment of a regulatory framework for a state chartered, special
purpose, fintech trust charter focused on virtual currency business
activities, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) has
sought to take a lead in this area by announcing, in 2016, initiatives
designed to create a special purpose national bank charter for fintech
business activities. In August 2015, the OCC announced it would
“develop a comprehensive framework to improve the OCC’s ability to
identify and understand trends and innovations in financial services, as
well as the evolving needs of consumers of financial services.”104
Following the announcement, the OCC published a paper in March
2016 entitled, Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal
Banking System: An OCC Perspective (“OCC Innovation Paper”).105
Noting, among other things, the broad innovation in financial
services taking place “outside the banking industry, often in unregulated
or lightly regulated fintech companies,” the OCC Innovation Paper
stressed that fintech companies are “growing rapidly, and attracting
increase[ed] investment” both in the U.S. and globally.106 The OCC
Innovation Paper concluded that bank and nonbank innovators, through
“strategic and prudent collaboration,” could benefit by employing their
respective advantages” nonbank innovators can gain access to funding
sources and large customer bases” and “banks can gain access to new
technologies.”107
The OCC Innovation Paper became the springboard for the
OCC’s subsequent efforts to create a fintech charter. To date, however,
a number of issues have arisen with respect to the OCC’s project. First,
while OCC special purpose banks such as trust and credit card banks are
exempt from parent company regulation under the Bank Holding

104. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 3 (2016) [hereinafter
OCC INNOVATION PAPER], https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/otherpublications-reports/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4.
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Company Act (the “BHCA”),108 it is not clear whether the Federal
Reserve Board (the “FRB”) would be comfortable with the creation of a
new bank charter exempt from the BHCA. Second, state regulators
have raised significant concerns as to whether the project is a
preemption Trojan horse, i.e., a way to route nonbank lending and other
activities around state usury and other consumer laws through a national
charter.109 Third, virtual currency companies and trade groups have
urged that such charters be structured so as to be user-friendly for
virtual currency activities.110 Finally, there has been speculation about
potential FDIC concerns about regulation and receivership of nondepository fintech charters; notably, the OCC recently proposed a rule
that would make clear that the OCC would handle all OCC uninsured
national bank failures.111
Nonetheless, on December 7, 2016, the OCC announced that it
would move forward with chartering fintech companies that offer bank
products and services to become special purpose national banks.112
Accompanying this decision, the OCC published a paper entitled,
Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies113 (“OCC Fintech Charter Paper”), discussing the issues and
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq. (2015).
See Lalita Clozel, OCC Fintech Charter Tramples States Rights: N.Y.
Superintendent, AM. BANKER (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:18 PM) (noting that the applicable law to
fintech companies is unclear); Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Balk at OCC Fintech Charter,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 19, 2016, 5:08 PM) (noting that a national fintech charter could weaken
state authority over consumer protection laws).
110. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh & Jerry Brito, Comments to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency on Supporting Responsible Innovation, COIN CENTER (May 27,
2016).
111. See Proposed Rule on Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg.
62835 (proposed on Sept. 13, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 51) (stating that the
OCC would conduct receiverships for banks that are not insured by the FDIC). In that
rulemaking, referring the OCC Innovation Paper, the OCC stated that–in undertaking the
rulemaking, one of its reasons it is considering how best to implement a regulatory
framework that is “receptive to responsible innovation, such as an advance in financial
technology,” and “in conjunction with this effort, considering whether a special purpose
charter could be an appropriate entity for the delivery of banking services in new ways,” and
thus, requesting comments on the utility of proposed necessary rules to such a special
purpose bank. Id. at 62837.
112. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC to Consider
Fintech Charter Applications, Seeks Comment, (Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter OCC Fintech
Press Release], https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016152.html; see also Thomas J. Curry, supra note 1, at 3 (“[T]he OCC will move forward with
chartering financial technology companies that offer bank products and services and meet
our high standards and chartering requirements.”).
113. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
108.
109.
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conditions that the agency will consider in granting special purpose
national bank charters, with a request for public comment.114 In so
doing, the OCC raised a number of significant points and issues related
to attributes and regulation of the new charter.
First, the OCC identified the potential universe of fintech
companies that may explore a special purpose charter—such as
marketplace lenders providing consumer and small business loans,
payment-related services, companies engaged in digital currencies and
distributed ledger technology, and financial planning and wealth
management products and services.115 Second, OCC fintech chartered
banks “would be held to the same rigorous standards of safety and
soundness, fair access and fair treatment of customers that apply to all
national banks.”116 Third, the OCC “may need to account for
differences in business models and the applicability of certain laws.”117
It specifically cited as an example “a fintech company with a special
purpose national bank charter that does not take deposits, and therefore
is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),
[and thus] would not be subject to laws that apply only to depository
institutions.”118 As such, the OCC Fintech Charter Paper clarifies prior
confusion in this area by making clear that OCC’s policy is that special
purpose national banks that do not engage in deposit taking are not
required to obtain deposit insurance.119
Fourth, notably, the OCC did not take the position that creating
a national bank fintech charter required a notice and public comment
rulemaking process, nor is the agency proposing one. As such, the OCC
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016) [hereinafter OCC FINTECH
CHARTER
PAPER],
https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/
special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf.
114. Id. at 15 (public comments were submitted through January 15, 2017).
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. Notably after some prior confusion about whether the OCC would require
deposit insurance for national trust banks, the OCC’s recent Proposed Trust Bank
Receivership Rules also stated: “There are only a small number of uninsured national banks
in operation today. The OCC, however, retains the authority to grand new charters to
entities whose business plan does not call for them to obtain deposit insurance if the OCC
determines that the entities have a reasonable chance of succeeding and can operate in a safe
and sound manner, among other considerations.” Proposed Rule on Receiverships for
Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 62835 (proposed on Sept. 13, 2016) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. Part 51).
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will be issuing such charters under its existing authority to grant special
purpose national bank charters.120 Whether this position opens the OCC
to the possibility of legal challenges regarding its authority to do so
without a rulemaking process subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act remains to be seen. Fifth, a special purpose national bank that
conducts administrative activities other than the trust and fiduciary
activities “must conduct at least one of the following core banking
functions: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money.”121
Interestingly, the OCC generally observed that “there is no legal
limitation on the type of ‘special purpose’ for which a national bank
charter may be granted, so long as the entity engages fiduciary activities
or in receiving deposits, paying checks or lending money.”122 In so
doing, it also stated that “the OCC has the legal authority to construe
these activities to include a wide range of bank permissible technologybased innovations in financial services”—including considering “on a
case-by-case basis the permissibility of a new activity that a company
seeking a special purpose charter wishes to conduct.”123
Sixth, “in general, a special purpose national bank will be
subject to the same laws, regulations, examinations, reporting
requirements, and on-going regulation and supervision as other national
banks.”124 Other laws that will apply to special purpose national banks
include: industry laws, lending and consumer financial laws, BSA and
AML laws, OFAC rules and sanctions, “prohibitions on engaging in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices
under section 1036 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) . . . and bank chartering
regulations and licencing policies.”125 Seventh, “a special purpose
120. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 3; see also National Bank Act §§
324-5138, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–26 (2012).; Home Owners’ Loan Act §§ 301–375, 12 U.S.C. §§
1461–69 (OCC authority to grant national bank charters, which the OCC has interpreted to
include special purpose national banks).
121. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 116, at 3; See also Organizing a
National Bank or Savings Association, 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (required banking activities).
122. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 3–4.
123. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 4.
124. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5.
125. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5. See also Rules, Policies and
Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. Part 5 (2012) (OCC bank chartering paper);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL:
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensingCHARTERS (2016),
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national bank also has the same status and attributes under federal law
as a full service national bank;” notably this includes limits on state
visitorial powers, “federal preemption (including the OCC preemption
regulations) and federal judicial precedents to determine if or how a
state law applies,”126 and all “hot button” issues addressed in the DoddFrank Act.127 Eighth, the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) and
certain provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that only apply
to depository institutions would not apply to an uninsured special
purpose trust bank.128
Ninth, coordination with other regulators may be required, such
as the FRB to become members of the Federal Reserve System and
meet requirements of the BHCA,129 the FDIC where a fintech company
proposes to access deposits other than trust funds, and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau for compliance with federal consumer
financial laws.130 Tenth, the OCC sets its “baseline supervising
expectations” to meet “high supervisory standards.”131 Baseline
supervisory expectations stress, among other things, the importance of a
“detailed business plan, governance, capital, liquidity, compliance risk
management, financial inclusion, and recovery resolution planning.”132
manuals/charters.pdf.
126. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5.
127. In this regard, the OCC stated:
For example, under these statues, rules and precedents, state laws would
not apply if they would require a national bank to be licensed in order to
engage in certain types of activity or business. Examples of state laws
that would generally apply to national banks include state laws on antidiscrimination, fair lending, debt collection, taxation, zoning, criminal
laws, and torts. In addition, any other state laws that only incidentally
affect national banks’ exercise of their federally authorized powers to
lend, take deposits, and engage in other federally authorized activities
are not preempted. Moreover, the OCC has taken the position that state
laws aimed at unfair or deceptive treatment of customers apply to
national banks.
OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 5. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1044, 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012)
(state law preemption standards for national banks).
128. Id.
129. For example, qualifications for one of the exemptions from the definition of “bank”
within the BHCA, and thus, any parent company or control entity is exempt from regulation
as a bank holding company. See Bank Holding Company Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012)
(exemptions from “bank” definition under the BHCA such as for trust banks).
130. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 6-8 and accompanying notes.
131. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 8.
132. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 8 and accompanying notes.
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Eleventh, distinct from any CRA obligatory, special purpose
bank applicants that seek to engage in lending activities must
demonstrate a commitment to the “global issue” of “financial inclusion”
that supports “fair access to financial services and fair treatment of
customers.”133 Twelfth, the OCC will review business plans to include
alternate business “recovery and exit strategies,” stress test scenarios,
and worst-case resolution plans.134 The mandated planning requiring
stress tests and resolution planning resembles the requirements
applicable only to systematically important financial institutions
(“SIFIs”) under the Dodd-Frank Act.135
Thirteenth, as part of the OCC chartering process, the OCC will
impose certain standard requirements when a bank is granted
preliminary approval, as well as other conditions as appropriate.136
Fourteenth, as has been done with other special purpose national banks
such as trust funds, the OCC may modify or adapt capital and other
legal requirements.137 These changes would lead to a process of
negotiation on appropriate capital levels on certain business activities,
although any new OCC precedents will be revised as the agency grants
new charters for particular business models.138 Finally, the OCC
requested public “feedback” (ostensibly as opposed to “comments” if it
were seeking notice and comment in a public rulemaking, rather than a
paper) on a wide range of issues.139
133. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 11–13 and accompanying notes;
see generally OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 116, at 12 n.30 (for an analysis of
financially unserved and financial inclusion).
134. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 12–13.
135. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
204(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(1) (2015) (stating that the section “provide(s) the necessary
authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral
hazard”).
136. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes; see
also, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CONDITIONAL APPROVAL #1143
(Jan. 2016).
137. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes.
138. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes
(stating that “the OCC would consider adapting requirements applicable to a fintech
applicant for a special purpose national bank charter to the extent consistent with applicable
law”).
139. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 15–16. Specifically, the OCC
asked for feedback regarding the following:
1. What are the public policy benefits of approving fintech companies to operate under a
national bank charter? What are the risks?
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Within a few days of the announcement, the NYDFS
Superintendent issued a public statement strongly opposing the charter
and any efforts “to federalize what states have been doing–and doing
well–for over a quarter of a century,” asserting that “[h]istory has
demonstrated that states, not the federal government, have the requisite
knowledge and experience to effectively regulate nondepository
financial services providers and guard against predatory and abusive
practices.”140

2. What elements should the OCC consider in establishing the capital and liquidity
requirements for an uninsured special purpose national bank that limits the type of
assets it holds?
3. What information should a special purpose national bank provide to the OCC to
demonstrate its commitment to financial inclusion to individuals, businesses and
communities? For instance, what new or alternative means (e.g., products, services)
might a special purpose national bank establish in furtherance of its support for
financial inclusion? How could an uninsured special purpose bank that uses innovative
methods to develop or deliver financial products or services in a virtual or physical
community demonstrate its commitment to financial inclusion?
4. Should the OCC seek a financial inclusion commitment from an uninsured special
purpose national bank that would not engage in lending, and if so, how could such a
bank demonstrate a commitment to financial inclusion?
5. How could a special purpose national bank that is not engaged in providing banking
services to the public support financial inclusion?
6. Should the OCC use its chartering authority as an opportunity to address the gaps in
protections afforded individuals versus small business borrowers, and if so, how?
7. What are potential challenges in executing or adapting a fintech business model to
meet regulatory expectations, and what specific conditions governing the activities of
special purpose national banks should the OCC consider?
8. What actions should the OCC take to ensure special purpose national banks operate in
a safe and sound manner and in the public interest?
9. Would a fintech special purpose national bank have any competitive advantages over
full-service banks the OCC should address? Are there risks to full-service banks from
fintech companies that do not have bank charters?
10.Are there particular products or services offered by fintech companies, such as digital
currencies, that may require different approaches to supervision to mitigate risk for
both the institution and the broader financial system?
11.How can the OCC enhance its coordination and communication with other regulators
that have jurisdiction over a proposed special purpose national bank, its parent
company, or its activities?
12.Certain risks may be increased in a special purpose national bank because of its
concentration in a limited number of business activities. How can the OCC ensure that
a special purpose national bank sufficiently mitigates these risks?
13.What additional information, materials, and technical assistance from the OCC would
a prospective fintech applicant find useful in the application process?
OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 15–16.
140. N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., STATEMENT BY N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS.
SUPERINTENDENT MARIA T. VULLO REGARDING THE OCC SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK
CHARTER FOR FINTECH COS. (2016) http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1612021.htm.
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Uniform State Law: The Regulation of Virtual Currency
Business Act

In February 2016, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) published a discussion draft of
the Regulation of Virtual Currency Business Act (“VC Business
Act”).141 As with its other similar projects, the VC Business Act is
designed to provide a uniform state law governing the operation of a
business, wherever located, that engages in the “virtual currency
business.”142 The term virtual currency business is broadly defined to
include offering virtual currency transfer and storage services,
facilitating virtual currency transfers, offering the conversion of virtual
currency, or otherwise offering services and products that assist
residents of a state or jurisdiction to acquire, convert, or transfer virtual
currency.143 It similarly provides broad definitions of terms such as
virtual currency,144 virtual currency business activity,145 and what
constitutes a transfer of virtual currency.146 The comments to the VC
Business Act (the “Comment”) note that its overall goal is to capture
activities that meet the definition of “virtual currency business
activity.”147

141. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT REGULATION OF
VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT, (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT], http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%20virtual%20currencies/
2016feb_RVCBA_Mtg%20Draft.pdf; see generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT (June 3, 2016)
(providing a later draft of the proposed act).
142. See DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 1 (“This [act] governs the
operation of a person, wherever located, that engages in or holds itself out as engaging in
virtual currency business activity with a resident of this [state].”).
143. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §102(a)–(d).
144. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §§102(a)–(d), 103(24), (“Virtual
currency means any digital unit of value that is used as a medium of exchange or that
substitutes in a transaction for money but that is not money. The term includes digital units
of exchange that (i) have a centralized repository or administrator, (ii) have no centralized
repository or administrator, or (iii) may be created or obtained by computing or
manufacturing effort.”).
145. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 103(25).
146. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 103(25), 103(19) (stating that
“transfer” includes “any change in ownership, possession or power to execute or prevent
transactions”)
147. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. The Comment noted that questions
arise including whether the “virtual currency” definition should include “e-precious metals”
and e-certificates for precious metals that can be transferred from one owner to another. In
so doing, the Comment stated that FinCEN “issued guidance in August 2015 that extended
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In considering other issues such as how to include an “on-ramp”
for new entrants to the virtual currency business, de minimus
exceptions, and whether to differentiate principal versus intermediary
activities, the draft also presented a final question that concerned
coverage or exclusion of trust companies who receive their charters and
powers from states.148 The Comment noted that New York State issued
a trust company charter to itBit in 2015.149 ItBit’s ability to engage in
transactions with residents of other states was challenged by other states
and, thus, for this draft information about inclusion or exclusion of trust
companies is “bracketed” until the Drafting Committee can further
discuss this issue with particularity.150
As such, the Comment raises the question of what happens
when one state that is participating in a reciprocal arrangement, creates
a special purpose digital currency exchange trust charter, but other
states do not recognize it as such.151 To date, however, no effort has
been made by states to invoke reciprocity arrangements governing the
interstate activities of traditional trust companies.152
In this regard, the draft VC Business Act specifically addresses
reciprocal licensing arrangements, providing three alternatives for
reciprocity and instructing that “a jurisdiction should select one.”153
The draft VC Business Act also addresses a wide range of business and

its March 2013 guidance concerning what types of business activity with virtual currency
render the business a ‘money services business’ for the purposes of federal AML
requirements under 31 C.F.R. Part X.” Compare DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141,
at 9, with FIN-2015-R001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Issuing
Physical or Digital Negotiable Certificates of Ownership of Precious Metals, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 3 (August 14, 2015), https://
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/administrative_ruling/FIN-2015-R001.pdf (including eprecious metals and e-certificates for precious metals),
148. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9.
149. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9.
150. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9.
151. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9.
152. See, e.g., Lalita Cozel, Are Trust Charters the Key to Simplifying Fintech
Regulations, AM. BANKER (November 8, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/aretrust-charters-the-key-to-simplifying-fintech-regulation (discussing the fact that the only
two digital currency exchanges licensed by New York State as special purpose trust
companies have had significant challenges making the case to regulators of their trust status
outside New York, due, among other things, causing uncertain scenarios for these
companies). Cozel notes that there are “uncertain scenarios in a number of states that simply
do not have experience with digital currency or digital currency exchange.” Id. (quoting V.
Gerard Comizio, Fried Frank LLP).
153. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 203.
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regulatory aspects of such businesses, including licensing and
applications,154 net worth and minimum capital requirements,155
authority to conduct regulatory examinations,156 cooperation and data
sharing authority,157 change in control and merger regulatory standards
and approvals,158 records maintenance,159 confidentiality,160 license
suspension and revocation,161 cease and desist orders,162 civil money
penalties,163 end user disclosure protections,164 and compliance policies
with procedures.165 Interestingly, the Committee has reserved important
topics such as cyber security programs and monitoring, business
continuity with disaster recovery program requirements,
and
permissible investments for further discussion.166
It remains to be seen whether the VC Business Act is timely
adopted as a model code, and, if so, whether it becomes an influential
model for state legislatures in adopting virtual currency legislation.
However, previous model codes of the NCCUSL have made enormous
contributions to national legal uniformity in many significant areas.167
For example, model codes of corporate, commercial, and financial law
that have been widely accepted and adopted by states have reduced the
need for businesses to deal with different laws as they move and do
business in different states.168

DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §§ 202, 203.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 207.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 301.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 302.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 303.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 304.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 305.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 501.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 502.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 504.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 702.
DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 901.
See DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141 at §§ 401, 402, 801, 802 [Reserved]
(declining to offer guidance).
167. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of
Uniform Law, 35 J. CORP. L. 327 (2009). “[S]tates tended to widely adopt NCCUSL
proposals where uniformity was efficient—that is, where the parties’ conduct or transactions
may be subject to the laws of several different states, making it difficult to determine at the
time of the conduct, or even at the time of litigation, which state law will apply, and where
the affected parties cannot easily settle these issues by contract.” Id. at 330, 360.
Conversely, developing a model code “necessitates compromises that undermine
uniformity.” Id.
168.
See id. at 330 (discussing the value of uniform laws “where the parties’ conduct or
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Outside of the U.S., virtual currency laws, regulations, and
policies are emerging globally. This section surveys a few select
jurisdictions with significant impact on the global financial services
industry: (1) the European Union (“EU”), (2) the United Kingdom
(“UK”), (3) the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (4) China,
and (5) Japan. While this survey is by no means comprehensive, only a
handful of countries have specific regulations applicable to virtual
currency use; at least forty jurisdictions, exclusive of the EU, have
ventured to varying extents into regulation of virtual currency.169
A.

The European Union: The European Bank Authority

In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the
EU established the European Banking Authority (“EBA”) as an
independent authority designed to, among other things, ensure effective
and consolidated prudential regulation and provide supervision across
the EU banking sector.170 The purpose of the EBA “is to contribute to
the creation of the European Single Rulebook in banking whose
objective is to provide a single set of harmonized prudential rules for
financial institutions throughout the EU.”171 Further, the EBA is

transactions may be subject to the laws of several different states”).
169. See GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LL File
No. 2014-010233, REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Jan.2014), http://
www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoin.pdf
(surveying
bitcoin
regulation in forty countries and the EU); see also Kashmir Hill Bitcoin’s Legality Around
The World, FORBES (January 30, 2014, 6:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2014/01/31/bitcoins-legality-around-the-world/#1e84a28379b2 (discussing the report
compiled by the Law Library of Congress); Cameron Fuller Bitcoin Around the World:
How Virtual Currencies Are Treated in 40 Different Countries, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2014, 4:16 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-around-world-how-virtual-currencies-aretreated-40-different-countries-1553532 (discussing the report compiled by the Law Library
of Congress); Brian Patrick Eha, How the World’s Richest Nations Are Regulating Bitcoin,
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.entrepeneur.com/article/231294 (discussing
regulation in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.).
170. See Regulation 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the council of 24
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/
78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 [hereinafter EBA Reg.] (establishing the EBA); About Us,
EBA, www.eba.europa.eu/about-us, (last visited Jan. 28, 2016); see also V. Gerard
Comizio, INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 325–39 (West Academic 2016)
171. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170.
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charged with promoting the “convergence of regulatory practices and
assessing the risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector”—the
world’s first supranational financial services regulator.172 In its short
time in existence, the EBA has weighed in heavily on virtual
currencies.173 First, in December 2013, the EBA issued its Warning to
Consumers on Virtual Currencies.174 The asserted reason for the
publication was to issue a “warning to highlight the possible risks . . .
[associated with] buying, holding or trading virtual currencies such as
Bitcoin.”175 The publication highlighted the potential risks including
the possibility of “losing your money” in the context of the fact that
“[n]o specific regulatory protections exist that would . . . cover losses if
a platform that exchanges or holds . . . virtual currencies fails or goes
out of business.”176
In encouraging consumers to understand the risks associated
with virtual currencies, the publication stressed the following potential
risks:
•

•
•
•
•

“you may lose your money on the exchange
platform,” including through theft and hacking
by third parties,
“your money may be stolen from your digital
wallet,”
“you are not protected” when using virtual
currencies as a means of payments,”
“the value of your virtual currency can change
quickly, and could even drop to zero,”
“transactions in virtual currency may be misused
for criminal activities, including money
laundering,” and

172. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170. The EBA was established
as part of the European System of Financial Supervision, and, pursuant to EU Regulation
1093/2010, took over all existing responsibilities and tasks of the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170.
173. See Report of the European Banking Authority, Warning to Consumers on Virtual
Passim (Dec. 12, 2013), https://
Currencies, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH.
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/598344/EBA+Warning+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf
(discussing what is involved in the use of virtual currency).
174.
Id.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id.
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“holding virtual currency may have tax
implications,” including value added or capital
gains tax.177

Finally, customers were warned that, in buying virtual
currencies, consumers should not use “real” money that they cannot
afford to lose nor keep large amounts of money in a digital wallet for
extended periods of time, but should become familiar with the
ownership, business model, transparency, and public perceptions of any
digital currency trading exchange platform they may consider using.178
As a follow up to its warning published in 2013, the EBA issued
its Opinion on Virtual Currencies179 (“VC Opinion”) in July 2014.
Stressing that one of the tasks of the EBA is to “monitor new and
existing financial activities,” and promulgate appropriate regulations
and guidance, the EBA noted that its 2013 warning did not address
“whether VCs can or should be regulated.”180 While noting that there
are some potential benefits of VCs, for example, “reduced transaction
costs, faster transaction speed, and financial inclusion,” the risks, by
ECB
identified
more
contrast,
“are
manifold.”181 The
than seventy perceived risks across several categories, including: “risks
to users, risks to non-user market participants, risks to financial integrity
such as money laundering and other financial crimes, risks to existing
payment systems in conventional fiat currencies, and risks to regulatory
authorities.”182 Thus, the EBA determined that a regulatory approach
that addresses VC risks comprehensively requires “a substantial body of
regulation” as part of having a “‘long-term regime.”183
The EBA made two recommendations for mitigating “some of
the more pressing risks.”184 First, the EBA recommended that all EU
national regulatory authorities advise credit and financial institutions,

177. Id. at 2–3.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Opinion on “Virtual Currencies”, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH. (July 4, 2014),

https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-201408+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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payments institutions and e-money institutions against buying, selling,
or holding VCs for their own account.185 In addition, the EBA “also
recommends that EU legislators consider declaring market participants
at the direct interface between conventional and virtual currencies, such
as virtual currency exchanges, [so-called] ‘obliged entities’ under the
EU [AML] Directive and thus subject to its [AML] and counter terrorist
financing requirements.”186
As a result, prompted by the terrorist attacks in France in 2015,
the European Commission adopted proposals in response to the EU
Council’s conclusions of February 2016 regarding the fight against the
financing of terrorism.187 These proposals underlined the importance of
achieving rapid progress of legislative actions, including in the field of
virtual currencies, and called on the Commission to submit targeted
amendments to EU Law.188 The European Parliament (“EP”) published
a parallel resolution and report in May 2016, in which the EP proposed,
inter alia, that the Commission develop recommendations for any
legislation needed to regulate the VC sector.189
In response to the legislative initiatives, the EBA published an
opinion responding to the commission’s proposal and set out seven
proposals that the EU commission and co-legislators should take into
account when finalizing the VC amendments to EU law.190 These
proposals included recommendations regarding the scope of VC
licensing, enforcement sanctions, control standards, information
exchange, and application of AML laws.191

Id.
Id. at 6.
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Presents Action Plan to
strengthen the fight against terrorist financing (Feb. 2, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-16-202_en.htm.
188. Id.
189. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, RESOLUTION ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 6 (May 26, 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA2016 0228+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
190. Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the EU Commission’s to Bring
Virtual Currencies into the Scope of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (4DMLD), EUROPEAN
BANKING AUTH. (Aug., 11 2016), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1547217/
EBA+Opinion+on+the+Commission%E2%80%99s+proposal+to+bring+virtual+currency+e
ntities+into+the+scope+of+4AMLD.
191. Id.
185.
186.
187.
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The United Kingdom

In August 2014, the U.K. government announced a program
looking into the particular benefits and risks associated with digital
currencies and underlying technology, with a particular focus on the
question of regulation.192 In November 2014, the government published
a request for public comment to gather views and evidence on these
questions and received over 120 responses from “members of the public
who use digital currencies, digital currency developers, business
providing digital currency-related services, banks, payment scheme
companies, academics, consultancies, and other government
departments and agencies.”193
In March 2015, Her Majesty’s Treasury published a report,
Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information (the “HM
Treasury Report”), that summarized stakeholder response regarding the
benefits and risks of digital currency, but also significantly reached
certain conclusions regarding next steps related to potential digital
currency regulation.194 The HM Treasury Report noted respondents
mentioned two factors in particular, which “were highlighted as the
192. Rt. Hon George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Launch of
the New Trade Body for Fintech, “Innovative Finance”, HM TREASURY (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-on-developing-fintech.
193. HM TREASURY, DIGITAL CURRENCIES: RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR INFORMATION 3
(2015) [hereinafter HM TREASURY REPORT]. It is interesting to note that the call for
information also asked for views on the impact of FinCEN application of anti-money
laundering regulations to administrators and exchangers of digital currencies. Id. at 13.

On the whole, responses from digital currency firms (including a
number which operate and are regulated in the U.S.) were positive,
reporting that regulation has increased the legitimacy of digital currency
firms, helped firms establish banking partnerships and investment, and
deterred criminals. Despite this, however, various submissions
commented that there is a lack of clarity about which categories of
business activity are captured by FinCEN requirements, and some said
that the process of registering in multiple American states has been
burdensome and has forced smaller firms to exit the market. A number
of submissions also commented on the proposed ‘BitLicense’
framework that has been put forward by the New York Department of
Financial Services. Digital currency firms answering on this agreed that
the proposed BitLicense regime, at least as initially drafted, would be
too wide in scope and would impose very high compliance costs on
digital currency firms and risk damaging the sector.
Id. at 13.
194. Id. at 19–20.
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main challenges digital currency businesses faced setting up in the
U.K.”195 Most respondents “mentioned the lack of a regulatory
framework for digital currencies, commenting that this has caused some
uncertainty for businesses and has made it difficult for the industry to
prove its credibility and legitimacy.”196 The second prevalent factor
“was that digital currency firms have encountered difficulties in opening
bank accounts in the U.K. . . .”197 In this vein, “[m]any businesses
described how they have been forced to open bank accounts overseas,
which results in day-to-day business being slower and drives up
costs.”198
Many respondents saw these issues as connected. For example,
“[s]ubmissions from the [U.K.] banking sector highlighted a lack of
regulation as a key reason for hesitation amongst banks [in accepting]
digital currency firms as customers.”199 Additionally, many digital
currency firms mentioned “the lack of access to banking as closely
related to the regulatory system.”200 With respect to “the question of
what steps the government could take to support the industry, many
responses focused on the question of bringing the sector into
regulation.”201 Well over two-thirds of responses “addressed whether
the government should introduce regulation of any kind” and more than
80% of these responses expressed the view that the “sector should have
some form of regulation . . . .”202
The HM Treasury Report acknowledged that “[t]he government
considers that digital currencies represent an interesting development in
payments technology, with distributed, peer-to-peer networks and the
use of cryptographic techniques making possible the efficient and
secure transfer of digital currency funds between users,” with potential
advantages “clearest for purposes such as micro-payments and crossborder transactions.”203 However, even while taking note of the
benefits, the HM Treasury Report also concluded that “digital
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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currencies have so far been adopted by a relatively small number of
consumers and retailers around the world, and both the technology, and
the industry that has grown up around it, are still in a nascent state.”204
Further, the HM Treasury Report also conceded that “[t]he evidence
suggests that [a] market in which digital currency firms are operating is
not functioning as well as it could, and there is a good case for
proportionate regulation at this time to provide a supportive
environment for legitimate digital currency users and businesses.”205
Notably, the HM Treasury Report also extensively discussed concerns
about potential risks presented by digital currency in relation to crime,
money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, sanctions evasion,
and how such potential risks could be mitigated by appropriate
regulations.206
The UK government response to these concerns was twofold.
First, it stated that while the evidence available indicates that illicit
actors have used digital currencies, the information does not suggest
that digital currencies have, at present, been widely adopted as a
payment vehicle in the wider criminal community.207 The government
noted that the degree of anonymity and the ease of making payments are
key drivers for potential criminal uses and the anonymous use of digital
currencies is closely linked to the absence of an effective “know your
government
customer” regime being in place.208 Second, the
recognized the “broad support” for “proportionate, but robust, antimoney laundering regulation in order to limit the abuse of digital
currencies by criminals or terrorists, and to support development and
innovation in the sector.”209
Among its conclusions, the HM Treasury Report noted that the
HM Treasury is dedicated to the creation of measures that are intended
to “create the right environment for legitimate actors to flourish, and to
create a hostile environment for illicit users of digital currencies.”210 It
also highlighted the importance of a favorable regulatory climate to
protect consumers, while simultaneously discouraging the use of digital
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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currency exchanges in furtherance of illegal conduct.211 First, the
distinctive features of digital currencies can be attractive to illegal users
as well as people and businesses that wish to use digital currencies for
legitimate purposes.212 In response, the government intends to apply
anti-money laundering regulation to digital currency exchanges, to
support innovation and prevent criminal use.213 The government
committed to, and has since began “a full consultation on the proposed
regulatory approach . . . [to] seek views and evidence on key questions
including how anti-money laundering regulation should be applied to
the digital currencies sector, the scope of the regulatory [framework],
and the identity of the regulator.”214 Second, as part of the consultation
on the proposed regulatory approach, the government will look at how
to ensure that law enforcement bodies have “effective skills, tools, and
legislation to identify and prosecute criminal activity relating to digital
currencies, including the ability to seize and confiscate digital currency
funds where transactions are for criminal purposes.”215
Finally, due to the “nascent state of the technology and the
surrounding industry,” digital currencies offer various risks.216 To
counteract this potential exposure, the U.K. “government consider[ed]
that a framework for best practice standards for consumer protection
[was] the right step to take at this stage, in order to address the risks
identified, but without imposing a disproportionate regulatory burden on
the industry,” and “intend[ed] to work with . . . the digital currency
industry to develop pioneering voluntary standards for consumer
protection.”217 Since the HM Treasury Report, the U.K. has begun
exploring various regulatory initiatives related to digital currency, while
at the same time stressing the desire for the U.K. to be a global center
for fintech.218

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 11,19.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Peter Campbell, Osborne Wants London to be Global Centre for FinTech,
THE FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015) (stating that the Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that
UK regulators will provide “space where innovation can happen”).
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

A working committee of the Bank for International Settlements
Committee on Banking Supervision,219 the Committee on Payments and
Market Infrastructures (the “CPMI”), among other things, aims at
“strengthening regulation, policy[,] and practices” in the payment
system, clearing settlements[,] and related arrangements.220 In
November 2015, the CPMI issued a report on digital currencies (the
“CPMI Report”), in considering the “possible implications of interest to
central banks” worldwide arising from innovations in digital
currencies.221 The CPMI Report concluded that regulatory issues for
digital currencies based on distributed ledgers cover three main fields:
“consumer protection, prudential and organizational rules for the
different stakeholders, and specific operating rules as payment
mechanisms.”222 Further, the CPMI Report concluded that given the
nature of digital currencies, “which are typically online and therefore
not limited to national jurisdictions,” a global approach may be
important for regulation to be fully effective.223 Nonetheless, the CPMI
Report stressed that the need for a global approach does not preclude
certain actions at the national level, identifying at least five general
categories of action:
•

Information/moral
suasion:
rather
than
interfering directly with the development of
digital currencies, authorities could decide to use
moral suasion towards users and investors in
order to highlight the relevant risks and to
influence the market.

•

Regulation of specific entities: via such an

219. See generally V. Gerard Comizio, INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 184–211 (West
Academic 2016) (discussing the role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in
global banking regulation).
220. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures–Overview, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (last updated May 13, 2015), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf.
221. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2015).
222. Id. at 12.
223. Id.
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institutional approach, authorities could establish
a limited set of regulations for specific types of
entities (e.g., those that enable interaction
between digital currencies and traditional
payment instruments and/or the real economy).
Firms that might be subject to specific regulation
include
intermediaries
providing
digital
currency-related services such as exchanges,
merchant acceptance facilities, and “digital
wallet” applications enabling users to store and
transact in their units of the digital currency.
•

Interpretation of existing regulations: some
authorities may be able to assess whether
existing regulatory arrangements might be
applied to digital currencies and digital currency
intermediaries. One example is the area of
taxation law, where authorities have made
determinations of how tax legislation might
apply to digital currency arrangements.

•

Broader regulation: although jurisdictional
issues are likely to be a challenge, authorities
might seek to take a broader approach to
regulation, potentially reflecting a functional
approach such that regulatory obligations that
apply to traditional payment methods and
intermediaries also apply to digital currency
schemes and digital currency intermediaries. As
an example, authorities might seek to ensure that
AML/know-your-customer
(“KYC”)
requirements apply to digital currency
transactions and counterparties, or that the same
consumer protection arrangements apply to
transactions conducted with digital currencies as
to other payment methods used by consumers.

•

Prohibition: authorities could seek to ban the use
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of digital currencies in their respective
jurisdictions. Practically, this could imply a ban
on any digital currency based financial activities,
as well as digital currency exchanges or digital
currency
acceptance
by
retailers.224
Finally, the CPMI Report concluded that “[t]hese categories
[could] provide a general framework for the analysis and classification
of actions undertaken by national authorities.”225
D.

China

In December 2013, the Chinese central bank announced that all
Chinese financial institutions and payments systems were barred from
handling virtual currency.226 The notice from the Peoples Bank of
China (the “PBOC”) stated that the ban was imposed because no
“nation or central authority” backed bitcoin.227 The PBOC stated that it
was “planning to step up its efforts to curb the use of bitcoins to launder
cash.”228 Individuals were advised that they were “still free to trade in
bitcoins, but should be aware of the risks involved.”229 The notice
detailed that PBOC “planned to formalize the regulation of exchanges
that dealt in digital currency.”230 Further, Alibaba, China’s top internet
retailer, announced on January 9, 2014, that it was prohibiting the use of
bitcoin on its online shopping platforms, thereby rendering the practical
use of bitcoin even more challenging in China, despite massive investor
interest in virtual currencies within the country.231
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the PBOC Governor Zhou

Id.
Id.
See Joe McDonald, China Bans its Banks from Handling Bitcoin, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2013, 3:43 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/peoples-bank-of-chinawarns-on-bitcoin-2013-12; China Bans Banks From Handling Bitcoin Trade, BBC Online
News (Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter BBC News], http://www.bbc.com/news/technology25233224.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Charters Piley, Alibaba bans Bitcoin Amid China Crackdown, CNN MONEY (Jan.
9, 2014, 12:32 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/09/news/bitcoin-alibaba/.
224.
225.
226.
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Xiaochuan subsequently stated that China would not seek to ban
bitcoins and other virtual currencies entirely.232 He further observed
that he viewed bitcoin as “more of a kind of tradable and collectible
asset, such as stamps rather than a payment currency.”233
E.

Japan

Japan has taken a proactive role in regulatory virtual currency
business activities, through its (1) Funds Settlement Law, (2) Banking
Act, and (3) Anti-money Laundering Laws.
1. Funds Settlement Law
The Funds Settlement Law,234 aimed at protecting users of
settlement services and enhancing the safety and efficiency of such
systems, was recently amended to directly regulate virtual currency
exchange operators (“VCEOs”), which include domestic virtual
currency exchange operators (“DVCEOs”) and foreign virtual currency
exchange operators (“FVCEOs”).235 Amendments are scheduled to
come into effect no later than June 3, 2017 (the “New Funds Settlement
Law”). 236
VCEO Business, a term of art as defined by the New Funds
Settlement Law, is a business that engages in: (a) trading virtual
currencies or exchanging virtual currencies with other
virtual
currencies, (b) acting as a broker, intermediary, or agent for the
transactions detailed in (a), or (c) managing customers’ monies or

232. Pete Rizzo, China’s Central Bank Governor: PBOC Won’t Ban Bitcoin, COINDESK
(April 11, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/chinas-central-bank-governor-pbocwont-ban-bitcoin/ (quoting Xiaochuan as saying: “It is out of the question of banning
bitcoin as it not started by a central bank.”).
233. Id.
234. 資金決済に関する法律Shikin kessai ni kansuru hōritsu [Funds Settlement Law],
Law No. 59 of 2009 (Japan).
235. Id.; TSUTOMU HIRAISHI & TADASHI KOIZUMI, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT:
NEW LAW ALLOWING FOREIGN NON-BANKING ENTITIES TO ENGAGE IN THE MONEY
TRANSFER BUSINESS IN JAPAN (2009), yourbusiness/newsletter/bankingfinance/
Client%20Alert_New%20Fund%20settlement%20Law.pdf.
236. Jōhō tsushin gijutsu no shintentou no kankyō henka ni taiō suru tame no ginkōhōtō
no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [New Funds Settlement Law], Law No. 62 of 2016 (Japan);
JONES DAY, JAPAN LEGAL UPDATE VOL. 15 (2016), http://thewritestuff.jonesday.com/cv/
66fd66a19aa605da38cc6b132f83b37ed90e648b.
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virtual currencies as part of (a) or (b).237 Under the New Funds
Settlement Law, an entity, domestic or foreign, seeking to offer VCEO
services in Japan is required to register with the Prime Minister.238 The
statute assumes that any business operating with respect to Japan is to
be regulated.239 How one’s activities in Japan are evaluated for the
regulatory applicability is not entirely clear. Even if Japanese presence
is limited to online availability, there is a possibility that a VCEO
business will nevertheless be caught within the law’s regulatory scope
since exchange services are inherently continuous in nature and are
aimed at a broad audience.240
In order for a FVCEO241 to be granted registration, it must have
a local business office as well as a locally residing representative.242 A
FVCEO, unless registered under this law, is explicitly prohibited from
conducting marketing aimed at customers in Japan.243 VCEOs who
engage in digital currency exchange services without registration,
whether foreign or domestic, are subject to criminal punishment of up
to three years of imprisonment, three million yen of fines, or both.244
Other registration requirements include being in sound financial
standing identified by: minimum capital requirements, net assets, and
prescribed by cabinet order;245 a sound operational management
structure; and, other structures that ensure compliance with the law.246
Once registered, VCEOs (including FVCEOs) will be required to
adhere to the following conditions:247

New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 2, para. 7.
New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 37.
New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art 37.
See 江頭憲治朗=中村直人「論点体系会社法6」第 一 法規 (2011 年) 69頁
(discussing how the Companies Act would determine whether a foreign company would be
required to register in Japan). If further confirmation on this point is desired the Japanese
Financial Services Agency’s opinion can be sought on a no-names basis. Id.
241. A FVCEO is defined as a digital currency exchange operator that operates in and is
registered (or similarly regulated) under laws similar to the New Funds Settlement Law in a
foreign country. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 2, para. 9.
242. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-5, para. 1.
243. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-22.
244. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 107.
245. Relevant ordinances have not yet been promulgated.
246. The specific content is undefined.
247. DVCEOs under the New Funds Settlements Law is defined as any entity registered
as such under Article 63-2. The Law assumes the FVCEOs will also be registered under
Article 63-2. As such, a VCEO referenced under this Law would include FVCEOs which
are also locally registered. Hence, FVCEOs would be subject to provisions applicable for
237.
238.
239.
240.
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•

Mandatory customer session: upon entering into
a contract, users must be given explanations on
fees and other contractual terms.248

•

Segregation of funds and auditing requirements:
VCEOs are required to segregate its own funds
from the clients’ and have a CPA or auditor
periodically review such fund status.249

•

Grievance resolution: as a general rule, a VCEO
will be required to contract with a designated
VCEO alternative dispute resolution institution
in order to resolve complaints.250

•

Reporting requirements: registered VCEOs are
required to record and preserve books and
submit business reports to the Prime Minister.251

•

Supervision: authorities will have the right to
enter into the VCEOs facilities, issue Business
Suspension Orders and revoke registration,
among others.252
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As Japan implements these new requirements they will continue
to strengthen the influence of their funds settlement regulations.253

DVCEOs. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-5, para. 1.
248. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-10.
249. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-11.
250. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-12.
251. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-13, 14.
252. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-15, 17.
253. See TSUTOMU HIRAISHI & TADASHI KOIZUMI, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT:
NEW LAW ALLOWING FOREIGN NON-BANKING ENTITIES TO ENGAGE IN THE MONEY
TRANSFER BUSINESS IN JAPAN (2009), yourbusiness/newsletter/bankingfinance/
Client%20Alert_New%20Fund%20settlement%20Law.pdf (predicting that the New Fund
Settlement Law “could bring about remarkable changes in the fund settlement and the fund
transfer businesses in Japan.”).
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2. Banking Act and Fund-Transmitting Transaction Business
Fund-transmitting transaction businesses (kawase torihiki) are
licensed entities that may engage in activities that only banks and
registered funds transfer service providers are allowed to conduct. 254
Fund-transmitting transactions are defined as “transactions achieved by
agreeing to transmit funds at the request of a client by not directly
transporting the money but by using a mechanism to transmit funds, or
agreeing to do such and carrying it out.”255 Because virtual currencies
can be used as a convenient and cost-efficient way to transfer funds,
they may be viewed as fund-transmitting transaction services. Under
the Banking Act, however, virtual currencies are not regarded at this
point as “funds”256 and sending virtual currency, by itself, would not be
seen as a fund-transmitting transaction. However, if a user deposits
funds at a local bank account that is converted to virtual currency,
transferred to a receiver’s digital account, and then converted to fiat
currency, it may be argued that the sender is essentially transmitting
funds to the receiver.257
3. Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: Act on Prevention of Transfer
of Criminal Proceeds
In line with the above revisions to the Funds Settlement Law,
the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation Act (the “AMLA”)258 was
amended to include VCEOs in the list of designated businesses required
to implement measures to detect and report potential money laundering
activities.259 Specifically, designated businesses are required to have
institutional mechanisms in place to conduct sufficient KYC procedures
at the time of account opening, collect and preserve KYC and
254. Ginkō-hō [Banking Act] Law No. 59 of 1981, art. 4, para. 1, art. 2, para. 2 (Japan);
Money transmitters are only allowed to conduct such services for values of less than one
million yen. Funds Settlement Law, supra note 234, art. 2, para. 2, art. 3, art. 37.
255. Banking Act, supra note 254, art. 61, para. 1, art. 64, para. 1; New Funds
Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 107.
256. Banking Act, supra note 254.
257. Yoshihiro Kataoka, FinTech’s Current Status and Legal Issues, ITU J. Vol . 46,
No. 7 (2016).
258. Hanzai ni yoru shūeki no iten bōshi ni kansuru hōritsu [Criminal Proceeds Act],
Law No. 22 of 2007 (Japan).
259. Id.

2017]

REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

175

transaction records, and report suspicious transactions to the
authorities.260 Like the New Funds Settlement Law, amendments to the
AMLA will come into effect no later than June 3, 2017. Further clarity
to the amended AMLA is expected in an upcoming cabinet order.
V. CONCLUSION
As virtual currency business activities and related fintech
companies continue to emerge and develop, they will continue to
present new and growing legal and regulatory challenges. The artistry
for governments and regulatory authorities will continue to be balancing
developments of innovative virtual currency technologies that will
potentially bring significant benefits with an effective legal and
regulatory framework that protects consumers, businesses, and the
financial system.261

260. There is no direct criminal punishment for non-compliance; however, if an entity
continues to disregard its KYC and reporting obligations despite receiving a Business
Improvement Order from the authorities, it may be subject to criminal punishment of up to
two years of imprisonment or three million yen in fines. Id. art. 25, art. 18.
261. As a follow up to the White House Fintech Summit in June 2016, the outgoing
Obama Administration recently published a White Paper through the National Economic
Council entitled A Framework for FinTech. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE, A
FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH 1 (2017); see also Adrienne Harris & Alex Zerden, A Framework
for FinTech, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Jan. 13, 2017, 6:36 PM), www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/
01/13/framework-fintech. This document sets forth policy objectives for the fintech sector
through “ten overarching principles that constitute a framework policy makers and
regulators can use to think about, engage with, and assess the fintech ecosystem in order to
meet these policy objectives.” Id.

